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A Symbol of Future European Social 
Policies: Establishing the Right to 
Information and Consultation of Workers 
within the European Union 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union's (EU) attempts at implementing a social 
mandate of informing and consulting employees of management de-
cisions in large undertakings, or companies, span over twenty years.! 
The current Directive, titled "Council Directive on the establishment 
of a European Works Councilor a procedure in Community-scale 
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the 
purposes of informing and consulting employees" (Directive), estab-
lishes as its goal the improvement of employees' rights to information 
and consultation.2 Accomplishing this goal requires the establishment 
of works councils or procedures for informing and consulting employ-
ees in all undertakings covered by the Directive.3 
Four principles integrated throughout the new Directive ensure 
success after twenty years of failed attempts: subsidiarity, flexibility, 
consensus, and guaranteed rights. The Directive implemented the 
principle of subsidiarity by granting Member States the freedom to 
adopt the key principles of the Directive while complying with pre-ex-
isting national arrangements.4 By designing a format best suited to 
1 New European Information and Consultation Draft, 245 EUR. INDUS. REL. REv. 18, 18 (1994) 
[hereinafter New Europeanl. The twenty-year span began with the 5th Directive on Company 
Structure. Id. The actual proposal was first suggested in 1980 with the Vredeling Directive. Abbie 
G. Baynes, The Impact of European Community Worker Participation Standards on the United States 
Multinational Form of EC Investment, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 81, 87 (1991). 
2 Directive 94/45, Council Directive of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European 
Works Councilor a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups 
of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees, art. 1, , 1, 1994 OJ. 
(L 254) 64 [hereinafter Council Directive l. Community-scale undertakings are defined in the 
Directive as any company with at least 1000 employees within the Member States as a whole and 
at least 150 employees in each of at least two Member States. Id. art. 2(1) (a). 
3 New European, supra note 1, at 18. 
4 European Works Councils: A Major Success Story for the E.U., RAPID,July 13, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Rapid File. 
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each undertaking's individual needs, the Directive incorporated a de-
gree of flexibility previously lacking.5 The Directive achieved the con-
sensus necessary for a level playing field within the Union by creating 
a minimum level of worker rights.6 From some perspectives, the most 
important aspect of the newest compromise on social policy centered 
on the Directive's effective guarantee of employee rights and the em-
ployees' ability to exercise their new rights. 7 While these four abstract 
changes ensured theoretical success, in reality, implementing the Di-
rective also required concrete changes such as the implementation of 
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union,8 and Britain opting out of 
the Social Protocol,9 
Part I of this Note provides a historical perspective of the Directive, 
including the initial attempt of the Vredeling Directive and the factors 
which both supported and ultimately ended the Vredeling Directive's 
chance of adoption. Part II focuses on the events throughout the EU 
which created a renewed interest in employee information and con-
sultation. Part III details the specific objectives and provisions of the 
new Directive. Part IV analyzes the legal authority of the EU to imple-
ment directives on social policy and how the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union strengthens the requisite authority. Part V deals with 




B TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND FINAL ACT, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 189c, 31 I.L.M. 247, 297 
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The Maastricht Treaty was adopted in November of 1993. 
GEORGE A. BERMANN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EC LAw 1155 (1993). It includes a Protocol on 
Social Policy annexed to the main treaty. Id. At the time adopted, 11 of the Member States agreed 
to the Protocol, which allows qualified majority voting on social policy issues, while Britain 
maintained the right to opt-Dut of any social laws adopted by the EU. Id. 
9 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 8, Protocol on Social Policy, 31 I.L.M. at 358 [hereinafter Social 
Protocol]. The Social Protocol includes the agreement on Social Policy between the Member 
States with the exception of Britain. The British consistently maintain clear opposition towards 
the accelerated harmonization of key aspects of social and labor policy. Michael Gold, Social 
Policy: The UK and Maastricht, NAT'L IN ST. ECON. REv., Feb. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, Asapii File. This opposition led to the Social Protocol, in which Member States agree to 
pursue the adoption of social and labor policies through the existing provisions of the EEC Treaty, 
but includes the provision that the Member States, excluding Britain, could pursue the more 
contentious issues outside the formal provisions of the Treaty in the face of U.K. opposition. Id. 
In such cases, majority voting in the Council will govern in the policy-making process for social 
and labor issues. Id. The Social Protocol states that the U.K. shall not take part in either the 
deliberations or the adoption by the Council of Commission proposals made on the basis of the 
Social Protocol. Id. 
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from the perspectives of the ED institutions, the Member States, and 
the companies affected. 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WORKS COUNCIL PROPOSALS 
Throughout the last twenty years, the ED unsuccessfully attempted 
to implement a policy of informing and consulting employees. lO Moti-
vated by a belief in the importance of employee participation, increas-
ingly complex international business operations, and the widely dispa-
rate legislation in the Member States, the ED continued developing 
proposals in this area. ll Motivated, in part, by the increasing develop-
ment of the Single Market,12 the ED also recognized the enhanced 
necessity for a comprehensive social policy.13 Since achieving a com-
petitive advantage must occur through free trade and not through 
divergent labor policies within the Member States, attaining the maxi-
mum benefits of the Single Market requires a comprehensive social 
policy. 14 
A. The Vredeling Directive 
In 1980, Mr. Henk Vredeling, a Social Mfairs Commissioner,15 pro-
posed the draft directive (Vredeling Directive) on procedures for in-
forming and consulting employees in large national and multinational 
companies16 which subsequently provided the basis for the current 
10 Information and Consultation in Eumpean Multinationals-Part One. 228 EUR. INDUS. REL. 
REv. 13, 15 (1993). 
11 Id. 
12The Single Market was to be achieved by 1992. Simon Bulmer & Andrew Scott, ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 3 (Simon Bulmer & Andrew Scott eds. 1994). The goals 
of the Single Market included the elimination of barriers to the free movement of goods, services, 
capital, and labor within Europe. Id. The ultimate goals of the Single Market included increasing 
the competitiveness of Europe and increasing the economic growth of the EU. See id. 
13 See Information and Consultation in European Multinationals-Part One, supra note 10, at 15. 
14 See Baynes, supra note 1, at 87. 
15 Mr. Vredeling was a member of the EU Commission appointed by the Netherlands. Christo-
pher Docksey, Emplrryee Information and Consultation Rights in the Member States of the European 
Communities, 7 COMPo LAB. L. 32, 34 (1985). As one of four main institutions of the EU, the 
Commission consists of members appointed by Member State governments for four year terms. 
Bermann, supra note 8, at 57. The Commission serves a function similar to the function served 
by the U.S. executive branch, in that it formulates general legislation and exercises power 
delegated to it by the legislature. Id. 
16 Proposal for a Council Directive of 24 October 1980 on procedures for informing and 
consulting the employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational 
undertakings, 1980 OJ. (C 297) 3; Docksey, supra note 15, at 34. 
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Directive. Under the Vredeling Directive, undertakings employing at 
least 1000 employees within the European Union,17 must provide an-
nual financial and economic data to employee representatives in the 
subsidiaries and establishments of each company.18 Additionally, the 
Vredeling Directive mandated consultation with the employee repre-
sentatives before implementing important decisions that affect employ-
ees.19 As part of this second obligation, the undertaking must inform 
its employees in writing of any event which may effect the employees' 
interests and allow a response within thirty days.20 While obligated to 
inform, the undertaking is not obligated to implement the employees' 
opinion in its final decision.21 
The obligations imposed by the proposed Vredeling Directive fo-
cused on achieving goals on two levels. First, by establishing the goal 
of protecting the rights of individual workers, the Vredeling Directive 
ensured "that workers employed by a subsidiary in the Community are 
kept informed as to the activities and prospects of the parent under-
taking and the subsidiaries as a whole, so that they may assess the 
possible impact on their interests."22 Second, by setting certain goals 
for the Union itself, including the creation of a uniform operating 
environment for all companies within the Union,23 the Vredeling Di-
rective established the goal of leveling the economic playing field and 
increasing European competitiveness. 
B. Reasons for the Failure of the Vredeling Directive 
Three major criticisms prevented the enactment of the proposed 
Vredeling Directive in the EU.24 Critics claimed that the Directive 
would decrease the EU's competitiveness by increasing the obligations 
on EU companies not incurred by other companies.25 The increased 
17 Dr. Walter Kolvenbach & Dr. Peter Hanau, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN EMPLOYEE CO-MAN-
AGEMENT, Vol. 4, 57, 58-59 (1993). 
18 [d. at 58. 
19 [d. at 58-59. 
20 [d. at 59. 
21 See Kolvenbach, supra note 17, at 59. 
221983 OJ. (C 217) 5; Kolvenbach, supra note 17, at 58. 
23 Baynes, supra note 1, at 87. 
24 See Kolvenbach, supra note 17, at 57. At the time of the Vredeling Directive, adopting the 
Directive would have required unanimous approval by Member States. 1994 EUTOscope: Social 
Affairs, Coopers & Lybrand, Oct. 27, 1994 at *10.2, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp 
file. Britain opposed any form of European-wide labor regulation, including this Directive. [d. 
By voting against this proposal, Britain effectively vetoed the Directive from becoming European 
law. See id. 
25 Kolvenbach, supra note 17, at 57. 
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obligations of informing and consulting employees raised speculations 
of increased delays and difficulties in planning for the management of 
companies, which would work against the goal of an efficient, flexible 
business structure.26 The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
criticized the proposal on an alternative basis, arguing that it would 
decrease worker rights by allowing Member States' to introduce less 
protective standards than those already in existence, thereby placing 
workers at a disadvantage as compared to their current position.27 The 
third area of criticism came from certain Member States. The British 
government, fearing a decline in national sovereignty, advocated vol-
untary employee involvement, rather than involvement by strict legis-
lative rules.28 Similarly, the German government favoring a solution 
based on state initiatives, argued that the proposal interfered with the 
Member States' pre-existing labor structures, and if implemented, 
could slow the reduction of unemployment.29 
II. EVENTS CREATING AN IMPETUS FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE 
Mter the Vredeling Directive, three events created the impetus for 
the new Directive on worker information and consultation. The imple-
mentation of the Social Charter, in 1989, served as the first step toward 
the new Directive.30 The Member States created the Social Charter as 
a result of their increasing awareness of the role social policies must 
play in strengthening the Single Market and because of their fear of 
social dumping caused by varied national policiesY The Social Charter 
26 [d. 
27 [d. at 61. 
28 [d. at 62. 
29 See id. at 63. 
30 See COMMUNITY CHARTER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS, [hereinafter 
SOCIAL CHARTER], Preamble (1989). In 1989 all Member States except Britain adopted the Social 
Charter. Bermann, supra note 8, at 1151. The Social Charter aimed to focus equal attention on 
the social aspects of the Single Market as well as the economic aspects. See Brian Bercusson, The 
Eumpean Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 53 MOD. L. REv. 624, 625 
(1990). 
31 Terence P. Stewart & Delphine A. Abellard, Labor Laws and Social Policies in the European 
Community After 1992, 23 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 508, 539 (1992). Social dumping occurs when 
firms choose to invest or locate their business in Member States with less protection for workers, 
basing the decision on the perceived lower overall cost of business. See id. at 540. While this may 
benefit the economies of countries with lower standards, it takes investment away from countries 
with higher standards, increasing the pressure on those countries to lower protection standards. 
See id. The divergent protection policies found in the national laws of the Member States raises 
the possibility of a two-tiered Europe, where only some members of the Union implement a 
uniform standard and others gain from lower standards, ultimately decreasing the cohesiveness 
of the Union. See id. at 539-40. 
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established as one area of fundamental social policy the information, 
consultation and participation of workers.32 The Social Charter re-
quired that companies inform and consult workers when the com-
pany's decisions affect the workers.33 Such decisions include technological 
change, restructuring, collective redundancy, and decisions affecting 
trans-frontier workers.34 Even though the Social Charter established as 
early as 1989 the importance of consulting employees, it was not legally 
binding upon the Member States.35 Instead of automatically changing 
the laws of Member States, it merely provided suggested objectives for 
the Member States.36 
The Maastricht Treaty provided another impetus for the current 
Directive. The Maastricht Treaty ultimately included a Protocol on 
Social Policy (Protocol) .37 One of the Protocol's objectives is the pro-
motion of dialogue between labor and management.38 To achieve this 
goal, the Union must support and complement the activities of Mem-
ber States in the field of informing and consulting workers.39 The 
significance of the Protocol is twofold. First, Britain opted out, making 
the adoption of measures possible without its approval,4o Second, the 
Protocol provided for an increase in qualified majority voting in so-
cial policy areas, increasing the likelihood and quickness of policy 
changes.41 
The drafting of the new Directive provided the final impetus.42 The 
Directive, before described as rigid and prescriptive, now consists pri-
marily of flexibility of choice.43 The Vredeling Directive, for example, 
aimed at direct information and consultation of employees, whereas 
the more recent Directive aims at creating a flexible framework by 
32 See SOCIAL CHARTER, supra note 30, Tit. 1, para. 17. 
33 ld. para. 18. 
341d. 
35 See Stewart & Abellard, supra note 31, at 542. 
361d. 
37 See generally Social Protocol, supra note 9. 
381d. art. 1. 
391d. art. 2. 
40 See Wolfgang Munchau, Paternity Policy Works Faster Without the Portillo Factor, THE TIMES 
NEWSPAPERS LTD., Sept. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Times File. 
41 Social Protocol, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 2. Paragraph two cites to article 189c of the 
Maastricht Treaty which provides in relevant part that the Union will follow the Parliamentary 
cooperation procedure. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 8, art. 189c. See infra note 105 for discussion 
of qualified majority voting. 
42 See Information and Consultation in Multinationals, supra note 10, at 15. 
431d. 
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which companies will create the specific means for conveying such 
information and for creating consultation procedures.44 Similarly, in-
stead of automatically imposing a mandatory structure for companies 
to establish a works council, the new Directive grants Member States 
the discretion to follow the existing structure of worker participation 
within each Member State.45 The new Directive also protects the auton-
omy of company management by ensuring flexibility in choice, so long 
as the company maintains the minimum standards.46 The changes in the 
content of the Directive suggest a change from an attempt to harmo-
nize toward an attempt to equalize while using existing institutionsY 
III. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKS 
COUNCILS OR PROCEDURES IN COMMUNITy-SCALE UNDERTAKINGS 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INFORMING AND CONSULTING EMPLOYEES 
On September 22,1994, the Council approved the "Directive on the 
establishment of Works Councils or Procedures in Community-scale 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employ-
ees."48 The Directive limits its scope to Community-scale undertakings 
or groups of undertakings with at least 1000 employees in the Union 
as a whole, and at least 150 employees in each of at least two Member 
States.49 By limiting the scope of the Directive to transnational under-
takings, the Union maintained the existing information and consulting 
procedures within Member States which are based on existing legisla-
tion.50 Instead, it regulates only those undertakings currently subject 
to multiple national legislation governing this issue.51 The following 
sections will discuss the obligations on the undertaking and the crea-
tion of the works councils. 
A. Key Obligations of the Directive 
The Directive imposes two main obligations on undertakings: to 
inform and to consult employees.52 The first obligation consists primar-
44 Kolvenbach, supra note 17, at 64.2. 
451d. at 64.2-64.3. 
461d. 
471d. at 64.3. 
48 See 1994 OJ. (C 135) 8. 
49 Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (a). 
50 Community Social Policy, 6 INTERNAL MARKET 136, 138 (1993). 
511d. 
52 See Council Directive, supra note 2, § 1, art. 1. This article provides that "the purpose of this 
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ily of disseminating information on the progress of the undertaking's 
business and prospects.53 This information should include details on 
the undertaking's structure, economic and financial situation, employ-
ment outlook and investment prospects.54 All information provided 
remains confidential and in some cases may be withheld if the infor-
mation would substantially damage the interest of the undertaking. 55 
The second primary obligation requires management to consult55 with 
employees whenever a decision could adversely effect the interests of 
the employees.57 Examples of such decisions include transfers, merg-
ers, cut-backs or closures of firms, any organizational changes, working 
methods, or manufacturing processes of the company. 58 After manage-
ment consults the employee representatives, the representatives have 
the right to reply.59 Management is not obligated to incorporate the 
employees' opinion in its final decision.50 
B. Procedure for Establishing Works Councils 
The responsibility of setting up works councils initially lies with the 
management of each undertaking. 51 Until September 22, 1996, under-
takings may establish a works council without the restrictions or re-
quirements of the Directive affecting their decision.52 According to the 
Directive is to improve the right to information and to consultation of employees in Community-
scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings." [d. art. 1, t 1. The two 
obligations also apply to undertakings whose parent organization is based outside of the European 
Union. [d. art. 4(2). In such a situation the responsibility of setting up a works council shall lie 
with the parent organization's representative agency in the Union. [d. 
53 See id. at Annex (2). 
54 [d.; Community Social Policy, supra note 50, at 138. 
55 Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 8(1); New Eurrtpean, supra note 1, at 22. The withholding 
of confidential information by management applies only in specific cases and under conditions 
established by national legislation. New European, supra note 1, at 22. Some Member States subject 
the withholding of information to a prior administrative or judicial authorization. [d. 
56 Consultation is defined as "the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between 
employees' representatives and central management or any other more appropriate level of 
management." Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 2(1)(£). 
57 Community Social Policy, supra note 50, at 138. 
58 [d. 
59 Council Directive, supra note 2, pmbl. 
60 See id. at Annex (3), ~ 3. The two obligations also apply to undertakings with a parent 
organization based outside of the European Union. [d. In such a situation, the responsibility of 
setting up a works council shall lie with its representative agency in the Community. [d. 
61 [d. art. 4(1). Negotiations for the establishment ofa European Committee or procedure may 
also be initiated by the written request of 100 employees or their representatives in at least two 
undertakings in at least two Member States. [d. art. 5 (1). 
62 European Works Councils: A Major Success Story for the EU, supra note 4. Article 13 of the 
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Directive, the management of each undertaking should, in the interim, 
initiate negotiations with the special negotiation body (SNB) which in-
cludes employees from each country.63 The SNB, once formed, should 
reach a written agreement with the central management on either a 
works councilor on an information and consultation procedure. 54 The 
negotiations should establish methods of calling meetings, costs of discus-
sions, and general procedures for informing and consulting employees. 55 
The undertakings bound by the Directive have four options.55 One 
option would result in a written agreement establishing a works council 
under article 6(2) of the Directive.57 Article 6(2) lists a number of issues 
that the agreement must cover, ranging from the function of the 
committee, to the procedure for informing and consulting, to the 
duration of the agreement and procedure for renegotiation.68 Unless 
provided otherwise, agreements on works councils under article 6(2) 
are not subject to the subsidiary requirements listed in the Annex.59 
The second result would be an agreement on an alternative infor-
mation and consultation procedure.70 The Directive makes very few 
stipulations as to what the alternative procedure must include. 71 The 
Directive does require the establishment of a method by which em-
ployee representatives will meet and discuss the information given to 
them by the undertaking.72 
The third result, a decision by the SNB and management to follow 
the subsidiary requirements, and the fourth result, no agreement is 
reached within two years, both result in the application of the subsidi-
ary requirements. 73 The subsidiary requirements consist of minimum 
Directive will allow company agreements covering the entire workforce that are in place by 
September 22, 1996 to stand without additional obligations imposed. Id. 
63 Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 5(2). The special negotiating body (SNB) is made up of 
elected or appointed members, with individual Member States determining the method of 
electing or appointing members from each country. Id. art. 5(2) (a). 
64 New Eumpean, supra note 1, at 20. It is important to recognize the SNB may also decide by 
two thirds of the vote to not open negotiations on the subject or to halt negotiations in process. 
See id. If the SNB chooses this option, it may not reconvene negotiation for two years and the 
company will not be governed by the subsidiary requirements. Id. 
65 Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 6; New European, supra note 1, at 20. 
66 See id. 
67 Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 6(2); New European, supra note 1, at 20. 
68 New European, supra note 1, at 20. 
69Id. 
70 Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 6(3). 
71 New European, supra note 1, at 20. 
72 Id. 
73 Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 7 (l); New European, supra note 1, at 20. 
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obligations explained in the Annex of the Directive.74 The Member 
States must incorporate the requirements into national legislation and 
apply them to undertakings in the above situations.75 The minimum 
requirements grant the works council at least one annual meeting with 
central management, informing the workers on the progress of the 
business and its prospects for the future. 76 Similarly, the minimum 
requirements grant the works council the right to consultation on 
management decisions affecting the workers.77 The management bears 
all costs of the works council. 78 
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR DIRECTIVE 
On September 22, 1994 the Social Affairs Council adopted the Direc-
tive.79 While the Maastricht Treaty added the Social Protocol, it did not 
explicitly grant the EU legal authority to implement social policy.80 The 
legal authority on which the EU has implemented this Directive is, 
therefore, only sufficient if viewed as a combination of the authority 
granted from both the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
A. Legal Authority of the EU before the Maastricht Treaty in 
Relation to Social Policy 
Critics of a European social policy center their objections on the 
EU's lack of judicial authority to promote social objectives.8! Propo-
nents assert that article 118 provides the EU with the authority for such 
proposals.82 Changed by the Single European Act,83 article 118 now 
74 New European, supra note 1, at 2l. 
75Id. 
76 Council Directive, supra note 2, at Annex (2). 
77 Id. at Annex (3). 
78Id. at Annex (7). 
79 Social Protocol, supra note 9, art. 2. Under the Protocol, the Commission will plan the 
implementation of the social action program on the basis of full agreement of all Member States. 
Gold, supra note 9. If the U.K. opposes any proposal, the Commission then has recourse to its 
second set of procedures laid out under the Social Protocol. Id. Under the Protocol procedures, 
the Commission resubmits the proposal to the Member States, excluding Britain, and the pro-
posal requires only a qualified majority to become European law. Id. 
80 See Antonio Lo Faro, EC Social Policy and 1993: The Dark Side of European Integration?, 14 
COMPo LAB. L. J. 1, 7 (1992). 
81Id. at 7. 
82Id. at 8. 
83 Bulmer, supra note 12, at 4. The Single European Act entered into force in July 1987. Id. It 
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states "the Commission shall have the task of promoting close coop-
eration between Member States in the social field."84 This language 
suggests a limited authority in social policy that centers on mere su-
pervision of the collaboration between Member States on an interna-
tionalleve1.85 The actual authority of the EU, therefore, diverges from 
the stated social justice objectives proclaimed in the SEA preamble.86 
The social objectives stated in the preamble do not, in themselves, 
grant a legal basis for the adoption of social policies.87 
Even if the authority to implement social policies within the EU is 
acceptable, the procedures required have slowed any such progress. 
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the SEA divided labor issues into two 
categories: issues dealing with the health and safety of workers,88 and 
issues affecting the rights and interests of employed persons.89 Article 
118A governed the first category of issues and allowed adoption by 
qualified majority.90 The later category, which included proposals for 
worker information and consultation, fell under article 100a(2) of the 
EEC Treaty, requiring unanimity.91 The chances of achieving unanimity 
for a proposal based on a history of divergent national policies were slim. 
The Commission's Directive of 1991 represented the challenge of 
obtaining unanimity under article 100.92 The European Parliament 
(EP) attempted unsuccessfully to avoid the British veto of the proposal 
by changing the legal basis for worker information and consultation 
to article 1I8A, which calls for a qualified majority.93 The EP inter-
preted article 1I8A by broadly defining "work environment."94 The 
argument centered on the idea that "work environment" was not lim-
included a formal commitment to furthering economic and social cohesion and mandated that 
the Commission legislate in these areas. See id. 
84 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 19S7 OJ. (L. 169) 1, art. 22,25 I.L.M. 506, 513 [hereinafter SEA]. 
Article 22 of the SEA supplements the EEC Treaty with art. lISa. Lo Faro, supra note SO, at S. 
85 Lo Faro, supra note SO, at S. 
86 See id. The Preamble of the SEA proclaims that the EU should aim for "social justice" and 
should be "determined to improve the economic and social situation by extending common 
policies and pursuing new objectives ... " See id. 
87 Lo Faro, supra note SO, at 9. 
88 SEA, supra note S4, art. 22. 
89 Lo Faro, supra note SO, at 10. 
90 SEA, supra note S4, art. 22; see Lo Faro, supra note SO, at 10. 
91 See Lo Faro, supra note SO, at 10. 
92 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Establishment of a European Works 
Council in Community-scale Undertakings or a Group of Undertakings for the purposes of 
Informing and Consulting Employees, 1991 OJ. (C 39) lO; see Lo Faro, supra note SO, at 14. 
93 Lo Faro, supra note SO, at 14. 
94 See id. at 12. 
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ited to sanitary protection of workers or their safety, but could also 
include other factors effecting the work environment, including con-
sultation and information.95 This argument by the EP failed, leaving 
adoption by unanimity as the only option for consultation directives 
prior to the Maastricht Treaty. 
B. Legal Authority after Maastricht for Social Policy 
While the Maastricht Treaty alone did not enhance the legal author-
ity for implementing social policy, it did include the Protocol on Social 
Policy.96 Within the Protocol, article 1 states that the promotion of 
dialogue between management and labor is one of the Union's major 
objectives.97 Article 2 provides the means to implement this objective.98 
Under the Protocol, the Union must support and complement the 
activities of Member States in the field of information and consultation 
ofworkers.99 Under article 2(2), the Council must adopt the directives 
under the cooperation procedure of article 189c of the Treaty on 
European Union. lOo 
The placement of directives relating to the information and consult-
ation of workers under article 189c ensures ratification based on the 
cooperation procedure. lOl This enhances the power of the EP by grant-
ing the EP a second reading of the proposal.102 In the past, the EP 
demonstrated a heightened awareness of the necessity for an effective 
European social policy.103 The new decision procedure should enhance 
the EP's influence and subsequently enhance the chance of imple-
menting social policy. 
The placing of consultation directives under article 189c also allows 
the adoption of directives by a qualified majority of the Member States, 
instead of by unanimity.104 While a majority has always been considered 
a more feasible goal to obtain than unanimity, it became even more 
95 See id. 
96 See Lo Faro, supra note 80, at 8. 
97 Social Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1. The text reads 'The Community and the Member States 
shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working condi-
tions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labor .... " ld. 
9S ld. art. 2. 
99 ld. 
100 ld. Paragraph 2 of the Protocol reads as 'The Council shall act in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 189c of the Treaty after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee." ld. 
101 See New European, supra note 1, at 18. 
102 See BERMANN, supra note 8, at 84. 
103 Lo Faro, supra note 80, at 9. 
104 ld. at 29. 
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likely after the British opted out of the Social Protocol. 105 The British 
opt-out clause forced the EU to determine what constitutes a qualified 
majority without the British voting presence.106 For proponents of the 
Directive, it also ensures that the foremost opponent no longer has a 
voice in the outcome of works councils.107 
V. ANALYSIS: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
DIRECTIVE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The Member States will have until September 1996 to translate the 
Works Council Directive into national legislation. 108 Under the proce-
dures established in the Directive, undertakings have two years to set 
up the information and consultation councils before the default sub-
sidiary rules would be triggered. 109 The Directive will affect an esti-
mated 1500 multinational companies operating within the EUYo The 
1500 undertakings include 200 U.S.-based firms such as IBM, Ford 
Motor Company, and General Motors. lll It will also affect close to fifty 
Japanese firms.1l2 
Although the legislation does not directly apply to the U.K due to 
their opt-{)ut clause in the Social Protocol, U.K firms with subsidiaries 
in continental Europe must comply with the Directive. 113 The Directive, 
therefore, will also affect one hundred U.K companies that employ 
over 1000 workers (not including British workers) outside of BritainY4 
The Directive does not require the inclusion of British employees in 
the works councils when employed by affected British companies.1l5 
While not obligated to include the British workers, it is assumed com-
105 See New European, supra note 1, at 18. This is the first Directive to proceed through the 
legislative process under the Social Protocol and with the British opt-out. SeeJerome Rivet, British 
gauernment to apt-out ofEU directives for first time, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 22, 1994, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Afp File. 
106 See New European, supra note 1, at 18. Before January 1995, this meant that with only 11 
Member States participating in the voting, 44 out of the 66 votes constituted a majority instead 
of the 54 needed if Britain participated. Id. 
107 See Coopers & Lybrand, Social Affairs, supra note 24, at *10.2. 
108Id. 
109Id. 
110 European Union Labor Ministers Approve Employee Advisory Directive, BNA MGMT. BRIEFING, 
June 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnanb File. 
III See New European, supra note 1, at 20. 
112Id. 
113 See id. 
114Id. 
115 Wolfgang Munchau, Maastricht apt-out may prove Britain's own goal, THE TIMES NEWSPAPERS 
LTD., June 22,1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Times File. 
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panies will include British workers because they will not gain a com-
petitive advantage from discriminating against them once the works 
council is already established.1l6 
The unique situation created by the British opt-out clause on social 
policies creates one possible adverse implication of the Directive. Once 
large companies adopt works councils, they will incur a competitive 
disadvantage in relation to large companies in Britain that are not 
affected by the increased obligations of the Directive. ll7 Consequently, 
social dumping could increase in Europe. ll8 Social dumping suggests 
that companies will invest in countries with lower and less restrictive 
labor standards, in this case, Britain.1l9 This is demonstrated by the 
recent relocation to the U.K from France by the Hoover Company.120 
Britain's exclusion from EU social policies operates as an invitation for 
investment by companies, such as Hoover, interested in producing 
cheaper products at the expense of worker rights.121 This invitation 
could create the two-tiered Europe the Directive aimed to eliminate 
through the creation of equalized standards.122 
The effect on the competitiveness of the EU suggests another ad-
verse implication of the Directive.123 Opponents fear that by increasing 
obligations on companies the Directive decreases the competitiveness 
of each company.124 They fear that the Directive, while not giving 
employees power to change management decisions, will give them the 
power to delay decisions.125 They fear that the Directive will impose a 
structure for the works council that will eliminate all flexibility and will 
ignore the national tradition of labor-management relations that has 
worked well in the past. 126 
Studies have shown that during the long legislative process of this 
Directive, companies have disregarded the potential adverse conse-
116Id. 
117 Id. 
118 See Henry G. Schermers, Editorial Comment: Are European Values being Hoovered Away?, 
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 445, 446 (1993). 
119 See id. 
120 See Hoover Affair Reopens Debate on European Social Policy, EUR. Soc. POL'y, Feb. II, 1993, 
available in LEXlS, Nexis Library, Eursoc File. 
121 See Schermers, supra note 118, at 448. 
122 See id. at 446. 
123 See Philip Bassett, UK Drawn into Web of EU Social Law, THE TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD., Sept. 
23, 1994, available in LEXlS, Nexis Library, Times File. 
124Munchau, supra note 115. 
125 See Kolvenbach, supra note 17, at 57. 
126 Bassett, supra note 123. 
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quences of the Directive and have implemented their own works coun-
cils.127 The mere prospect of having the ED establish the works councils 
motivated many companies including Nestle and Volkswagen, to reach 
voluntary agreements according to their own standards.128 The pream-
ble of the Volkswagen agreement asserts the balance most undertak-
ings attempt to strike within a works council by calling for an accep-
tance of a "social obligation towards its European plants and works 
councils" while "agree[ingJ that a successful social development is 
dependent on international competitiveness achieved through a high 
level of productivity and flexibility, making constantly increasing de-
mands in respect of the quality and environmental acceptability of the 
products."129 The Volkswagen agreement is a significant example, not 
only because the consultation provisions include the promise of incor-
porating the council's opinion into decision-making, but also because 
of its explicit recognition of the required balance between worker 
rights and business efficiency.13o 
The Commission, alternatively, has made this Directive into a sym-
bolic attempt at implementing social policies and has pushed social 
issues into the forefront of Europe. l3l The Commission, therefore, 
describes the implications of the Directive in a more positive light than 
the companies and trade unions. 132 The Commission believes the Di-
rective will have the highly beneficial effect of increasing workers' 
productivity and commitment to the undertakings.133 The increased 
productivity and commitment will ultimately directly increase the un-
dertakings' competitiveness and will indirectly increase the ED's com-
petitiveness. The Commission has concluded that on average, the cost 
of establishing a works council would be approximately twelve dollars 
per worker, per year.134 This minor cost would more than be offset by 
the economic benefits of increased competitiveness and productivity 
within each undertaking.135 
127 Inj(f171lation and Consultation in European Multinationals, supra note 10, at 15. 
128 See id. at 15, 18. 
129Id. at 18. 
130 See id. at 17-18. 
13l See What Price a Social Consensus in Europe?, EUR. INSIGHT, Apr. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis library, Eurins File. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the changes within the political and legal environment of 
the EU and the changes to the Directive itself, the EU has achieved its 
objective of implementing a duty to consult and inform employees. 
The increased flexibility within the Directive, demonstrated primarily 
through a company's freedom in establishing the structure and con-
tent of works councils, struck the ultimate compromise. While achiev-
ing the same end result of increased rights for workers, the EU main-
tained a degree of both national and corporate level autonomy. Only 
the future will determine whether this balance between corporate 
autonomy and the social rights of workers will be implemented union-
wide, and more importantly, whether it will effectively maintain the 
competitiveness of the European Union. One aspect is certain: the 
successful adoption and implementation of this Directive will undoubt-
edly affect the other social proposals planned for the European Union. 
Tricia A. Rice 
